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SEC RULE 1Ob-13: A RECONSIDERATION
by
Charles I. Wellborn*

W

HETHER those making cash tender offers' and exchange offers? should
be permitted to purchase target company stock outside their offers in
the open market has been the subject of much recent interest to the courts,'
the Securities and Exchange Commission," and the commentators.' One aspect
of that controversy concerns open market purchases by arbitrageurs and subsequent tenders by them of securities which are the subject of a pending tender
offer. The SEC recently announced that, despite an earlier staff opinion to the
contrary, rule IOb-13' does not prohibit open market purchases and subsequent
tenders by arbitrageurs who sign a soliciting dealer's agreement and receive a
soliciting dealer's fee for the tender.' The Commission's release describes the
context in which the issue arose:
Arbitrageurs in a tender offer typically make money on the differential between the market price at the time the tender offer is announced and the ten-

der price, which normally includes a premium above market. Their purchases
enable the public investor to elect to avoid the risk that the tender will not be
consummated or that it will be prorated. The receipt of a soliciting dealer's

fee by an arbitrageur enables him to enhance his profit by tendering his shares
at the tender price plus the soliciting dealer's fee.'

The Commission's position was expressed as follows:
The language of Rule lOb-13 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits a person making a tender offer from, directly or indirectly, purchasing or
making any arrangement to purchase the securities which are the subject of
the tender offer otherwise than pursuant to the tender offer. The intent of this

language is to protect public investors who, if the tender offer were prorated,
might lose the opportunity to tender all their shares whereas those whose

shares were purchased outside the tender offer would not be prorated [sic].
In view of that intent, the Commission views purchases and subsequent tenders
by arbitrageurs, accompanied by receipt of a soliciting dealer's fee, as permissible activities, provided that the payment of such soliciting dealer's fees is
adequately disclosed in the context of the tender offer."
* B.A., J.D., University of New Mexico; LL.M., New York University. Attorney at Law,
Albuquerque, New Mexico.
'Hereinafter referred to simply as "tender offers."
2The term "exchange offer" as used herein describes tender offers for any security in
exchange for any consideration other than solely for cash.
'See text accompanying notes 45-56 infra.
4
See text accompanying notes 12-19 infra.
'Goolrick, Purchases on the Market of Target Company Stock, 26 Bus. LAW. 457
(1970); Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 466
(1971); Lowenfels, Rule lOb-13, Rule lOb-6 and Purchases of Target Company Securities
During an Exchange Offer, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1392 (1969); Comment, The SEC's Rule
1Ob-6: Preserving a Competitive Market During Distributions, 1967 DUKE L.J. 809.
'See text accompanying note 18 infra.
"SEC Rule 10b-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1972), adopted pursuant to § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 5 78j(b) (1970), provides in part: "(a)
No person who makes a cash tender offer or exchange offer shall, directly or indirectly, purchase . . . any such security . . . otherwise than pursuant to such tender offer or exchange
offer from the time such tender offer is publicly announced .... "
'SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9395 (Nov. 24, 1971).
9Id.
10Id.
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A number of questions are raised by the release,1 but the most notable aspect
of the release is the Commission's apparent position that, at least with respect
to tender offers, rule 1Ob-13 has such a narrow purpose.
lOb-13
In October 1968 a proposed rule lOb-13 was published for comment. It
applied only to tender offers and proposed that a person making a tender offer
be required to purchase all tendered securities, at a price no lower than the
highest price he paid during the tender offer for the purchase of securities
of the same class outside the tender offer. The effect of the proposed rule would
have been to require an offeror who purchased securities on the open market
during the tender offer to purchase all of the tendered securities either at the
tender price or at the price paid on the open market, whichever was higher.
After receiving comment, a revised proposal was published in May 1969," in
the form in which the rule was finally adopted. The Commission noted, and apparently heeded, the objection made to the original proposal that potentially
heavy financial burdens would be imposed on companies found in violation of
the rule. The revised proposal simply put a blanket prohibition on purchases
outside the offer and also was extended to encompass exchange offers. As to
exchange offers, the release stated, the rule was "a codification of existing
interpretations under Rule 10b-6."'" Rule lOb-6 being an anti-manipulative
rule," proposed rule lob-13 thus took on an anti-manipulative cast.
Whatever the soundness of the Commission's position concerning the applicability of rule 10b-6 to exchange offers,1" rule lOb-6 could not under any
construction apply to tender offers, there being no distribution of securities by
the tender offeror. Thus, up to this point, it was the Commission's apparent
position that rule 1Ob-13 was to have an anti-manipulative purpose, but only
as to exchange offers. However, the Commission was aware that the problem
of possible market price distortion occurs in tender offers as well as in exchange
offers, and so made it clear that the rule was directed at price distortion in the
tender offer situation as well. With respect to the purchase by the offeror of
securities in the market and outside the tender offer, the release adopting rule
1Ob- 13 stated:
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF RULE

" For instance, the release appears to be limited to the situation where the arbitrageur
signs the soliciting dealer's agreement after the purchases have been made. But sea text following note 77 infra. The release also fails even to mention the contention made earlier by
the SEC staff that such purchases by the arbitrageur are made on the behalf of the tender
offeror.
The ruling is based on the conclusion that such purchases will not have the effect of
depriving the public investors of the right to have their shares taken up in situations where
the tender offer is prorated. This conclusion is open to question. By, in effect, paying arbitrageurs to buy and tender the shares of those who do not tender, those who do tender may
be prejudiced. Further, this conclusion suggests that the rule applies only to those tender
offers in which proration is necessary. This qualification is not contained in the rule.
12SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8391 (Aug. 30, 1968).
114 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1969).
Id.

11Rule lOb-6 states that it shall constitute a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" for any participant in a distribution of securities to bid for or purchase any security which is the subject of the distribution. SEC Rule lOb-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6
(1972).
See text accompanying notes 20-27 infra.
1
"See text accompanying notes 62-65 infra.

1972]

SEC RULE lOb-13

Irrespective of the price at which such purchases are made, they are often
fraudulent or manipulative in nature and they can deceive the investing public
as to the true state of affairs. Their consequences can be various, depending
upon conditions in the market and the nature of the purchases. They could
defeat the tender offer, either by driving the market price above the offer price
or by otherwise reducing the number of shares tendered below the stated minimum. Alternatively, they could further the tender offer by raising the market
price to the point where ordinary investors sell in the market to arbitrageurs,
who in turn tender."
Subsequently, in September 1971, an inquiry was made of the SEC staff
as to its position with regard to open market purchases by arbitrageurs who
receive soliciting dealers' fees. The staff's reply, consistent with the Commission's
position as it had previously been expressed, was that the Division of Trading
and Markets of the SEC viewed purchases by soliciting dealers as having been
made by the tender offeror and, therefore, in violation of rule lOb-13.18 It also
indicated that the rule could not be avoided simply by delaying the signing of a
soliciting dealer's agreement, if the circumstances indicated that at the time
of making the purchases, the arbitrageur had an intention to sign the agreement later and receive the fee. That position has now been overruled by the
Commission."0
II. THE LAW PRIOR TO RULE 10b-13

Rule 10b-6 was brought into being, along with rules 10b-7 and 10b-8,
primarily to implement the views of the Commission concerning the kind of
manipulative activity prohibited by the law existing at the time. Subsection
(a) (2) of section 9 of the Exchange Act' was intended by Congress to deal
with speculative pooling operations, "wash sales," and matched orders, but
it was up to the Commission under section 9(a) (6)"1 to establish rules regulating stabilization practices. In addition, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
gave the Commission power to establish regulations regarding manipulation
and deception. As a result of statutory amendments made in 1936' and 1938,"'
section 15 (c) of the Exchange Act' afforded over-the-counter markets at least
as great a degree of protection against manipulation as was afforded the exchange markets by section 9(a)." Until the adoption of rules 10b-6, 10b-7,
and 10b-8, the cases involving situations now governed by rule 10b-6 had
been decided on the basis of the foregoing provisions along with the anti-fraud
provisions of both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act."'
But much uncertainty existed about how these prohibitions would be en'SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969).
MSL Indus., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 78,320 (1971).

18

"oSee note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
2015 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970).
1

1 d. S 78i(a) (6).
Id. § 78j(b).

22

22

Act of May 27, 1936, ch. 462, § 3, 49 Star. 1378.
Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, § 2, 52 Stat. 1075. For a discussion of the evolution
of § 15 of the Exchange Act, see Tenth Annual Report of Securities and Exchange Commission, 10 SEC ANN. REP. 68, 69 (1944).
25 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1970).
"See Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 328 (1941).
"See generally Whitney, Rule lOb-6: The Special Study's Rediscovered Rule, 62 MICH.
L. REv. 567 (1964).
24
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forced; therefore, adoption of rules lOb-6, 10b-7, and 10b-8 was deemed appropriate in order that there would be "basic principles on paper instead of in
the brain cells of a comparatively few people."" The new rules, however, were
not a one-sided codification of the views of the Commission. There was considerable discussion with representatives of the industry and, by the time the
final version was decided upon, "the differences between the Commission's
staff and industry were greatly reduced." 9 The rules were designed to provide
functional definitions of the activities proscribed by the Act."0
The regulatory effect of rule 1Ob-6 is directed exclusively at market activities
during a distribution. All bidding and purchasing by those distributing is flatly
prohibited since the rule is premised on the view that bidding and purchasing
under those circumstances are for the proscribed purpose."
The rule [10b-61 is based on the sound premise that bids and purchases of a
security by a person engaged in the distribution of securities of the same class
constitute actual or a pparent active trading in such security by others. It has
long been an accepted premise that all market activities in a security by a person engaged in the distribution of a security of the same class are effected
for the purpose of inducing others to buy the distributed security."2
A power to grant exemptions on an ad hoc basis was retained for situations
where the Commission feels the purchase will not be manipulative and is
motivated by legitimate corporate purposes. When exemptions are granted,
certain conditions are imposed which are calculated to minimize the market
impact of the purchases." There is no differentiation between exchange and
over-the-counter market transactions though these markets are subject to regulation under separate sections of the statute.'
Prior to the time that rule lOb-6 became important in the tender offer, exchange offer, and merger areas, its application by the Commission was directed
at more or less classic manipulation situations. For example, in Gob Shops of
America, Inc.' and Bruns Nordeman & Co.," a distributing broker-dealer
28

Demmler, How Shall We Amend the SEC Acts?, 178 COM. & FIN. CHRON. 2361,
2438 (1953).
29 Foshay, Market Activities of
Participants in Securities Distributions, 45 VA. L. REV.

907, 919 (1959).

o [Rlule l0b-6 specifies those transactions encompassed by the prohibition in
section 9(a) (2) against 'actual and apparent active trading.' When adopted,
it was both a codification of 'principles which . .. [had] been generally followed' prior thereto, and an interpretation, on the basis of the general antimanipulative provisions of section 10(b), of the phrase 'actual and apparent
active trading' in section 9(a) (2).
Weiss & Leibowitz, Rule lOb-6 Revisited, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 474, 476 (1971).
81 Violations of the rule have, on occasion, been found to be "willful," however. See,
e.g., C.A. Benson & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7044 (Mar. 26, 1963).
"2Weiss & Leibowitz, supra note 30, at 477.
"Id. at 482. The authors, officials of the SEC's Division of Trading and Markets, suggest that typical conditions are limitations on the volume of securities purchased and the
price paid for them, the requirement that all purchases be made through a single broker,
and a prohibition against use of typical manipulative techniques, such as engaging in the
opening transactions in the securities on the exchange and purchasing shortly before closing
of the exchange. Id. at 483.
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 9, 15 U.S.C. 5 78i (1970), applies only to national exchanges. Section 15 of that Act, id. § 78o, is applicable only to over-the-counter
markets.
3239 S.E.C. 92 (1959).
3140 S.E.C. 652 (1961).
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placed progressively higher bids for a security, despite the fact that he was
still engaged in its distribution. Holding that rule 10b-6 was violated, the
Commission held that the rule applied whenever the offering was significant
in terms of dollars and in terms of the selling effort employed to market it. 7
And, in SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co.,8 the defendants were distributing a security
and, instead of purchasing the stock themselves, had a broker-dealer enter bids
for it on their behalf. The court found that all had violated rule 10b-6 and
that the broker-dealer had violated the rule not only as a principal because he
participated in the distribution, but as an aider and abettor of the violation by
those distributing.7" In Shearson Hammill & Co.'"a broker-dealer who engaged
in bidding for securities of the class being distributed was held in violation of
rule lOb-6 despite the contention that legitimately motivated dealers also
submitted bids at a similar price level. In none of these, or other court and
Commission actions, is there any indication that rule 10b-6 was intended to
regulate any activities but those which by their nature were clearly designed to
maintain artificially the market price of a security in preparation for or during
a distribution of that security to the public.
It was not until 1966 that there was any formal expression of the SEC's
opinion regarding applicability of rule 10b-6 to the acquisition of one corporation's securities by another by tender offer, exchange, or merger. In SEC
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.4' the SEC took the position that open market purchases by a corporation of its own shares for employee stock bonus plans, and
by its shareholders for investment, were in violation of rule 10b-6 because
the corporation was then engaged in the acquisition of other corporations by
means of an exchange of stock. Under the terms of some of the acquisition
agreements, the amount of stock which Georgia-Pacific would have to relinquish was dependent upon the market price of Georgia-Pacific stock during
certain periods. The SEC charged in its complaint4 ' that these purchases were
made in such a manner as to avoid or reduce the number of shares GeorgiaPacific would otherwise be required to issue in connection with those acquisitions. Georgia-Pacific consented to a judgment which outlined the conditions
under which such market activity in the future might be carried out. The final
order provided, inter alia, that there would be no bidding or purchasing by the
defendant corporation or the defendant shareholders' while the corporation was
distributing securities or during the period when the terms of an acquisition
agreement with another firm were being established. Similarly, in an informal
proceeding reported in the prospectus of Genesco, Inc., dated May 10, 1966,"4
Genesco agreed to discontinue open-market purchases of its stock for two stock
"7See also F.S. Johns & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7972 (Oct. 10,
1966), aF/'d sub nom. Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); Hayden Lynch &
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7935 (Aug. 10, 1966); J.H. Goddard &
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7618 (June 4, 1965').
3' 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
19 Id. at 909.
41 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (Nov. 12, 1965).
41 [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
4' Excerpts reprinted id. 5 91,680.
4'Presumably, any such prohibition as to shareholders could only be directed to those
with some "control" status.
Reprinted in part in [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 77,354.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

purchase plans and a retirement trust during the course of merger or exchange
offer transactions. In addition, the prospectus disclosed possible contingent
liabilities arising out of purchases made during previous exchange offers and
mergers.
The courts have also had occasion to deal with these problems. In Miller v.
Steinbach' the plaintiff was a stockholder of Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, which had negotiated a merger with Armour & Co. During the negotiations, Armour was conducting a rights offering to its shareholders, and Armour's
underwriters made purchases of some of the rights at the beginning and at the
end of the subscription period. The plaintiff, a Baldwin shareholder, had been
unaware of the rights offering and claimed that the underwriter's purchases
of the rights gave artificial support to the market price of Armour stock,
which resulted in his receiving a lesser package of securities than he would
have received had the Armour stock not been thus over-valued. The court found
that a claim under rule 10b-6 had been stated, and denied a motion to dismiss
the complaint, stating, "[tihe purpose of Rule 10b-6 is to prohibit trading
activity which might affect the price of the securities being offered and thus
create unnatural market levels."'
Since that decision, three court rulings have been handed down dealing
specifically with attempted enforcement of the prohibition now embodied in
rule 10b-13 by placing reliance on rule 10b-6. In Armour & Co. v.. General
Host Corp."7 General Host made an exchange offer for the common stock of
Armour, and Armour sought to enjoin the exchange, alleging among other
things that one or more of the defendants had participated in market purchases
of Armour stock after the effective date of its registration statement for the
exchange offer. The court denied the injunction and noted that there was evidence supporting the defendants' contention that the purchases were exempted
by the rule as "brokerage transactions not involving solicitation of the customer's order."4 The court also indicated that there was a substantial question
whether subsection (b) of rule 10b-6 "applied to the stock of the 'target'
corporation, as well as that of the distributor. '
In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.9 Chris-Craft and Bangor Punta Corporation both sought control of Piper, each making competing
exchange offers for its shares. Chris-Craft sought to enjoin Bangor Punta from
voting the Piper stock it had acquired outside the exchange offer. Its argument
was based on the revised proposal of rule IOb-13 and the release accompanying
it which stated that, as to exchange offers, the then-proposed rule represented
a codification of existing interpretations under rule 10b-6. 1 The court analyzed
rule 10b-6 and concluded that it could find no support for the SEC's claim that
such interpretations existed, and stated, as to Bangor Punta's purchases of
Piper stock, that "[any increase in the price of Piper shares as a result of
40

268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
1d. at 280.

47296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
4
See SEC Rule 10b-6(a) (3) (v), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a) (3) (v) (1972).
0'296 F. Supp. at 476 n.18.
5'303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afI'd in part and fev'd in part sub nom. ChrisCraft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970).
" See text accompanying notes 14, 15 supra.
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these transactions would obviously serve only to make Bangor Punta's exchange
offer appear less desirable to Piper shareholders.""a
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the ruling in a split decision." The
majority read the language of rule iOb-6 as precluding such purchases because it prohibits purchases of "any right to purchase such security"" as well
as purchases of the security to be distributed. Since target stock carried the
right to purchase the exchange offeror's securities, said the court, purchases
of target company stock are prohibited. This construction has been criticized,"
but it is not of much significance now in light of the adoption of rule 10b-13,
which clearly applies to such purchases. More importantly in terms of this
analysis, the court undertook to respond to the claim of Bangor Punta that
its purchases had, by raising the price of the target company's stock, decreased
the probabilities of success of the offer, and, therefore, had an effect opposite
to that which it claimed rule lOb-6 was intended to prevent. The court
responded:
[Tihis argument overlooks the decided benefits that purchases of target company's stock can produce for the initiator of an exchange offer. If the price of
the target company's stock does increase in response to cash purchases by the
exchange offeror after the offer has been announced, many shareholders in the
target company are likely to assume that the price increase results solely from
the bullish effect of the exchange offer on the market. Small investors especially
would be likely to assume that the exchange offer was receiving serious attention and approbation from larger more knowledgeable investors than they ....
Prevention of this kind of manipulation seems well within the spirit of
Rule 1Ob-6.'
The court's reasoning has prompted criticism, but the critics are not consistent." They have suggested: (1) that more sophisticated, not less sophisticated, investors would be encouraged to tender as a result of a price increase
in target company stock; 8 (2) that a price increase in target company stock
will diminish the prospects for success of the exchange offer because arbitrage,
where it can operate, is the main force in the market place and it cannot operate
in the absence of a suitable spread between the prices of each security;* (3)
that a price increase in target company stock would increase the probabilities
of success of the offer because it would encourage sales in the open market
where the shares would be purchased by arbitrageurs buying with the expectation of tendering;"0 (4) that, in any event, the court's reasoning is at odds
with that in another Second Circuit decision where it was stated, as to market
" 303 F. Supp. at 198.
Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970).
See SEC Rule 10b-6(a) (3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3) (1972).
1*426 F.2d at 579 (dissenting opinion); see Lowenfels, supra note 5, at 1399.
56426 F.2d at 577.
" In addition, all of the critics noted here ignore the fact that the court said only that
purchases of target company stock can produce benefits for the offeror and, rather than asserting that its theory was correct to the exclusion of all others, seems to suggest that Bangor
Punta's theory was not entitled to that consideration.
" Henry, supra note 5, at 476.
5
Chris-Craft
54

,Goolrick, supra note 5, at 463; O'Boyle, Changing Tactics in Tender Offers, 25 Bus.

LAw. 863, 866 (1970).
"oHenry, supra note 5, at 476; also adopted in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8712 (Oct. 8, 1969).
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purchases by a competing offeror opposing an exchange offer, that it was
"reasonable to conclude" that a resulting price rise would induce target company shareholders not to tender, but to retain what was apparently an increasingly valuable investment."'
Surely, no one of these theories is always correct and the others always
wrong. More likely, all of these theories are correct at different times, with
respect to different investors. This fact demonstrates the futility of attempting
to fit the regulatory scheme of rule lOb-6 to purchases of target company stock
by tender and exchange offerors. It will be recalled that rule lOb-6 was based
on the "accepted premise that all market activities in a security by a person
engaged in the distribution of a security of the same class are effected for
the 'purpose of inducing' others to buy the distributed security."' 2 Is there such
an accepted premise about the purpose of purchases of target company stock
by the offeror during a pending tender or exchange offer? The diversity of
opinion as to the possible effects of Bangor Punta's purchases of target company
stock and the resulting rise in market price demonstrates that the nature of
these effects is speculative at best. Being speculative, there could certainly be
no "accepted premise" that the purchases were actually intended by the offeror
to produce any particular result." Even more, although purchases by one engaged in an ordinary distribution are difficult to explain," purchases of target
company stock by an offeror are often prompted by the totally non-manipulative purpose of attempting to insure that the offeror obtains sufficient votes
to carry a merger, or to defeat a merger proposed by the target's management
with a third corporation.' On this basis, it seems clear that where purchases
of target company stock are concerned, rule lOb-6 concepts of regulation are
inapposite.
This is not to say that regulation in the area is unwarranted." It was said
in connection with the development of rule lOb-6 that "[tihe decision of a
potential investor whether or not to purchase should be predicated on normal
rather than exceptional circumstances. '"" This principle is equally applicable
where a tender offer or exchange offer is made. The decision of the target
company shareholder should be predicated on normal rather than exceptional
circumstances. When the tender or exchange offeror goes outside the offer
and makes, directly or indirectly, purchases of target company stock in the
01 Goolrick, sapra note 5, at 463; Henry, supra note 5, at 481, citing Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cit. 1969).
62See Weiss & Leibowitz, supra note 30, at 477, quoted in text accompanying note 32
supra.
"' Note that the word "manipulate" is defined in WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1376 (1965) as "to control, manage, or play upon by artful, unfair or insidious means .... ..
"One limited exception to this, suggested by Foshay, supra note 29, at 933, is purchases
for an employee stock purchase plan. Yet, the Georgia-Pacific and Genesco proceedings
demonstrate that such purchases may, nonetheless, be a vehicle for manipulation.
"5Often the management of the target company will seek a "defensive merger." See
Schmultz & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115, 132-33
(1967).
"But cf. Lowenfels, supra note 5, at 1406, where it is stated that prohibition of target
company purchases outside the exchange offer constitutes "an unnecessary encroachment
upon the functionings of a free market .... " No commentator has spoken in favor of prohibition of such purchases, all choosing to criticize both the Second Circuit and the SEC.
67 Foshay, supra note 29, at 928.
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market, it creates exceptional circumstances by suggesting a demand for target
company stock which is, in fact, artificial. And, according to the theories
mentioned earlier,"8 a price rise in target company stock significantly influences
public investor reaction to the offer.
In order to deal effectively with the problem, it must be analyzed in its
proper perspective. First, since the market purchases by the offeror cannot, in
fact, be presumed to be manipulative, as in the situations for which rule 1Ob-6
is designed, the Commission should no longer maintain the untenable position
that rule lOb-13 represents in any way an application of that rule. It would
be more plausible for the Commission to base the prohibition on its power
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to regulate deceptive devices. This
approach would avoid the necessity of demonstrating that the target company
purchases were made with any particular public investor reaction in mind,
which a claim of manipulation would require. The SEC's argument would be
that despite a lack of specific intent to raise the market price of target company
stock or to induce target company shareholders to act in any particular way,
an artificial demand for target company stock is itself deceiving. Thus, the
creation of such a demand by the offeror is a deceptive device in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security."
The strongest statutory basis for restriction of purchases of the target company stock lies, however, in section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, which served,
in part, as the SEC's statutory basis for rule lOb-13. 0
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact . . . necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security
holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
The Commission shall, for the purposes of this sub-section, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.'
The language is quite broad in its scope and on the basis of the expressed
statutory intent of the Williams Acte' to provide the target company share" See notes 58-61 supra, and accompanying text.
"Note that in adopting § 13(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1970),
enacted in 1968 as part of the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Star. 454 (1968),
Congress recognized that target company repurchases of its shares during a pending tender
or exchange offer may be deceiving. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP, H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 D, at 5 (1968). Rule 13e-1, adopted in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8370 (July 30, 1968), and amended in SEC Securities Exchange Act Releases
Nos. 8392 (Aug. 30, 1968) and 8556 (Mar. 24, 1969), requires disclosure of the purchases; and proposed rule 13e-2, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8930 (July 13,
1970), would limit such purchases as to timing and amount in order to minimize their
impact on the purchase price.
7Sections 13(e) and 23(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e), 78w(a)
(1970), also served as
a basis for the rule.
71 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
72Id. The Williams Act was described in H.R. REP. NO. 1711, supra note 69, at 2, as
an act which:
[A]mends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by requiring the disclosure
of pertinent information and would afford other protections to stockholders
(1) when a person or group of persons seeks to acquire a substantial block
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holder the opportunity of making an informed judgment whether he should
accept the take-over offer7" and the addition in 1970 of the final sentence of
this subsection,"4 the Commission is afforded a broad basis for regulating
market activities of tender and exchange offerors. In doing so, no sufficient
reason appears why the Commission should have to rely on concepts of deception or manipulation that have developed in other contexts."
III. THE SEC's POSITION: RELEASE No. 9395
Returning now to the SEC's recently announced position regarding the
activities of arbitrageurs, it is necessary to determine whether it furthers the
goal of insuring the presence of "normal rather than exceptional circumstances""0 on the basis of which the decision of the target company shareholder
to tender or not to tender will be made.
The SEC's release states that it is permissible for an arbitrageur who has
purchased securities in the open market to tender those securities to a tender
offeror and receive a soliciting dealer's fee, providing payment of the fee is
disclosed "in the context of the tender offer."7 Narrowly reading the release,
it is not clear whether one who is already acting as a soliciting dealer may
make purchases of the target company stock which it will later tender, though
a distinction on that basis would be difficult since, except in very unusual cases,
the arbitrageur buys with a view to tendering the stock so purchased irrespective of when the soliciting dealer's agreement is signed.
In an exchange offer, an arbitrageur will simultaneously buy shares of the
target company and sell short the securities of the offeror for which the
target company's stock is exchangeable. Upon the expiration of the offer, he
will exchange his shares of target company stock for the securities of the
offeror and these will be used to cover his prior short sales. In a tender offer,
the arbitrageur will buy target company shares in the open market and tender
them for cash on the closing date, profiting by the price differential between
his cost and the price specified by the tender offeror."8
Obviously, the arbitrageur adds a good deal of liquidity to the market for
the stock of target company shareholders who may wish to sell their shares in
of equity securities of a corporation by a cash tender offer, alternately called
a 'takeover bid,' or through open market or privately negotiated purchases,
or (2) when a corporation repurchases its own equity securities.
7
See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 69, 5 A, at 2.
7
Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84 Stat. 1497, amending 15 U.S.C.
78n(e) (1970).
7 But cf. the suggestion in Lowenfels, supra note 5, that rule 10b-13 is invalid unless
some application of rule 10b-6 is possible.
Note that there is no intent to deal here with the question of whether a total ban on
market purchases by offerors during the offer is a more desirable means of regulation than
restrictions on such purchases like those set forth in proposed rule 13e-2, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8930 (July 13, 1970), as to target company repurchases.
" See note 67 supra, and accompanying text.
"7SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9395 (Nov. 24, 1971). The release sheds
no light on the meaning of this phrase, but presumably all that would be required is a general statement in the offer itself that such fees would be paid.
78See an excellent treatment of this subject in Henry, supra note 5. See also N.Y. Times,
Dec. 8, 1971, at 96, col. 3, which notes that the Commission's position in Release No. 9395
came as a surprise to the investment community.
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the open market during the pendency of the offer."8 As it is estimated that in
tender and exchange offers over fifty per cent of all shares tendered come
through tenders by arbitrageurs," they are clearly a quite dominant force in
these offers. Because both the target company shareholder and the arbitrageur
appraise the value of target company stock with reference to the same economic
facts, such as the cash tender price or the market value of the securities offered
in exchange, the arbitrageur is in one sense simply another investor in the
market place. But if the arbitrageur is allowed to receive a soliciting dealer's
fee upon tender, he is thereby enabled to pay more than other potential investors would be willing to pay for the stock in the market. Indeed, as the SEC's
release itself noted: "The anticipation of receipt of the soliciting dealer's fee
may induce the arbitrageur to purchase the stock to be tendered at prices up
to, and possibly even in excess of, the tender price."81 The not unlikely rise
in market price resulting from purchases by those anticipating receipt of the
fee will be exactly what the court and the SEC attempted to deal with in the
Bangor Puntacase." As in that case, the rise in market price of target company
stock results from the operation of artificial market forces.'
The Commission suggests that requiring disclosure of payment of the fee
will counteract the deceptive influence of these price rises. But if market price
distortion exists, the only really helpful disclosure would be what the actual
market price is, and that is effectively obscured. Two officials of the SEC's
Division of Trading and Markets have stated with regard to the market price
distortion caused by manipulation: "[Tihe deleterious effects of the prohibited
activities are impervious to disclosure."" The Commission itself in response
to a suggestion that disclosure rules be substituted for a prohibition against
manipulation has observed that "[aIny proposal which would weaken the
prohibition against manipulation in any aspect would deprive investors of
the most important safeguard afforded them by the Act."'
By its terms, rule 10b-13 prohibits "arrangements to purchase" the security
for which the tender or exchange offer is made. A literal reading of this
language alone seems to prohibit payment of soliciting dealers' fees to dealers
who tender shares that were purchased during the offer and in response to the
proffered bonus for so doing." In view of the fact that the net result of pay9 One reason for a sale in the market is suggested in the text accompanying note 60
supra.
SO'Boyle, supra note 59, at 866.
8" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9385 n.1 (Nov. 24, 1971).
82 Presumably, the most significant price effects would be exerted near the tender price
and near the expiration date of the offer.
'See that portion of the release quoted in the text accompanying note 17 supra, where
the Commission itself recognized the impact of a rise in market price on the success of a
tender offer.
4Weiss & Leibowitz, supra note 30, at 477. Weiss and Leibowitz note that disclosure
is called for in rule 10b-7 but point out that the strict limitations on trading imposed by
that rule are what provide the actual protection.
5 REPORT OF S.E.C. ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 77TH CONG., 1ST SESs. 50 (H.R.
Comm.
Print 1941).
8
6Cf. SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Rule 10b-13 ap-

plies to a narrower classof persons than does rule 10b-6, and, thus, the arbitrageur could

not be liable as a principal as was the broker-dealer in the Scott Taylor proceedings. But
he might well be, as the SEC staff had suggested in the MSL matter, liable as an aider and
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ment of the fee can be expected to be a market for the security which is
structured under exceptional circumstances, the necessity for prohibition of
payment of the fee is clear. 87 In 1934 Congress realized the necessity for outlawing "every ...device used to persuade the public that activity in a security
is the reflection of a genuine demand instead of a mirage."8 Though its concern in that instance was with intentional price distortion, the ban should
have equal force here.
But as indicated above, this is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Without
getting into the question of whether, as a matter of fairness, the fee should
ever be paid to a dealer owning the shares, " payment of the fee could still be
permitted as to shares in the dealer's inventory prior to the time that rule
lob-13 is applicable. "°
IV. CONCLUSION

It seems clear that the problems associated with open market purchases by
tender and exchange offerors outside their pending offers deserve further analysis. The Commission has attempted to deal with the problem as one of manipulation, but its position is unsupportable. The critics of the Commission's efforts
to date seem to suggest that the market distortion caused by the offeror is not
necessarily objectionable because it is not clear who will benefit from the
deception. Yet because the market distortions caused by this market activity
are deceiving to target company shareholders, regulation of this market activity
under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act is appropriate, and no reliance on
any previous interpretation or determination under rule lOb-6 is either necessary or appropriate. Because the payment of soliciting dealer's fees to arbitrageurs will be the likely source of the same kind of market price distortion
which rule lOb-13 should preclude, such payments should not be permitted
as to shares purchased in response to a tender or exchange offer, whether or
not the soliciting dealer's agreement is signed before the purchases are actually
made.

abettor of rule 10b-13 violations by the offeror. See notes 38, 39 supra, and accompanying
text.
87 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
8
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REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1934).
9 Both former SEC Chairman Cohen and General Counsel and now SEC Commissioner
Loomis thought it was discriminatory that professionals should get the commission for
shares they tender from their own accounts while private investors could not. Hearings on
S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 199-209 (1967).
"The rule, by its terms, comes into play at the time the tender offer or exchange offer
is publicly announced or otherwise made known by the person making the offer.

